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OUT OF MIND, OUT OF SIGHT: VOTING RESTRICTIONS 
BASED ON MENTAL COMPETENCY 
NAOMI DORAISAMY 
ABSTRACT 
 A vast majority of states allow for the right to vote to be stripped 
based on an individual’s mental status. However, the United States 
Constitution largely leaves voting qualifications to the states, so in 
practical effect the right to vote is largely determined by mental 
competency standards that vary between states. In this essay, I 
explore why mental competency voting restrictions persist, given the 
historical trend toward expanding the vote to vulnerable populations. 
Further, I question the “fraud prevention” justification for 
disenfranchisement based on mental status, given mixed reports on 
the actual prevalence of voter fraud. I conclude that the perception—
not reality—of electoral integrity remains a compelling government 
interest recognized in election law, arguably served by restricting the 
vote from those who may not be making an individual, meaningful 
choice. I discuss proposed mental competency standards that may be 
narrowly tailored enough to gauge an individual’s actual ability to 
participate in the electoral process. Finally, I conclude by suggesting 
that the lack of nationwide uniformity supports the establishment of a 
national standard for competency-based disenfranchisement. I 
contend that a workable, constitutionally sound standard eliminates 
categorical disenfranchisement, and requires individualized judicial 
inquiry into a voter’s capacity to understand and participate in the 
electoral process. 
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Greg Demor, a bright, autistic young man in Los Angeles, lost his right to vote 
at eighteen when a California judge granted his mother conservatorship over him.1 
Greg’s mother had requested conservatorship because she was concerned that 
upon turning eighteen he would be unable to make the necessary complex 
healthcare and financial decisions for his life, but because California law dictates 
that anyone with a legally appointed guardian loses the right to vote by default,2 
Greg was automatically deemed unfit to vote.3 
His story is not novel. Tens of thousands of Americans with mental disabilities 
lose the right to vote every year.4 All but nine states explicitly provide some means 
to restrict voting rights of those with mental disabilities.5 Eleven states do not 
require individualized judicial inquiry before automatically revoking the right to 
vote “upon adjudication of mental incapacity or guardianship.”6 As common as 
these restrictions are, there is no uniform standard for mental competence to vote.7 
(Several states do not clearly define what will disqualify a voter with mental 
disabilities).8 A person with a mental disability acknowledged by a court in Idaho, 
here fully permitted to vote, may relocate to Montana and find herself barred from 
voting.9 
At a time when Congress has considered serious sweeping changes “to expand 
Americans’ access to the ballot box,”10 at first blush it is troubling that mental 
disability restrictions are not being challenged. Consider the definition of 
“individual with a disability” in the current proposed text of H.R. 1: “an individual 
with an impairment that substantially limits any major life activities and who is 
 
1. Matt Vasilogambros, Thousands Lose Right to Vote Under 'Incompetence' Laws, PEW 
CHARITABLE TR.: STATELINE (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/03/21/thousands-lose-right-to-vote-under-incompetence-laws. 
2. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 4 (West, Westlaw through 2020); see also CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 2201(b), 
2208 (West 2020). In order to retain or regain the right to vote, a conservator (guardian) must make a 
recommendation of fitness to vote, and then a hearing must be held to adjudicate capability based on 
the ability to complete a voter registration affidavit. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5357(c) (West 2020); 
CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2209 (West 2020). 
3. Vasilogambros, supra note 1. 
4. Id. 
5. See Michele J. Feinstein & David K. Webber, Voting Under Guardianship: Individual Rights 
Require Individual Review, 10 NAELA J. 125, 142 (2014); Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Ties That Bind Idiots 
and Infamous Criminals: Disenfranchisement of Persons with Cognitive Impairments, 13 U. ST. THOMAS 
L.J. 100, 104 (2016); Jennifer Bindel, Equal Protection Jurisprudence and the Voting Rights of Persons 
with Diminished Mental Capacities, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 87, 92 (2009). 
6. Feinstein & Webber, supra note 5, at 133–34. 
7. Sally Balch Hurme & Paul S. Appelbaum, Defining and Assessing Capacity to Vote: The Effect 
of Mental Impairment on the Rights of Voters, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 931, 961 (2016). 
8. For example, Nebraska’s Constitution bars a person from voting if she is “non compos 
mentis,” which is defined in statute as “mentally incompetent.” See NEB. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (West, 
Westlaw through Mar. 26, 2020); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-312 (West 2020). However, “mental 
competency” is not the same as “mental incapacity,” which is the touchstone for guardianship. NEB. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 32-312 (West 2020). Ohio’s Constitution still bars voting by an “idiot” or “insane person.” 
OHIO CONST. art V, § 6 (West, Westlaw through 2020). 
9. See MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (West, Westlaw through 2019) (restricting the vote from 
someone deemed to have “unsound mind” by court).  
10. For the People Act of 2019, H.R. 1, 116th Cong. (2019). 
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otherwise qualified to vote in elections for Federal office.”11 This definition inheres 
in it the states’ ability to define voter qualifications within the Elections Clause.12 
In Part One of this essay, I lay out the background of mental competency 
restrictions as a voting qualification within the purview of individual states, setting 
out the constitutional framework and the fractured landscape of restrictions. Then 
the essay turns to the historical and modern justifications for restricting the vote 
based on mental competency.13 This Part identifies voter fraud prevention as the 
strongest state justification at play.14 The Third Part finally asks what is so 
compelling about these interests, given the difficulty of determining how often 
voter fraud actually occurs.15 This Part concludes that this compelling interest 
shores up the integrity of the electoral process by reinforcing perception of electoral 
integrity. Part Four then asks what a constitutionally sound standard for voting 
competence might look like, given various recommendations and proposed 
methods of testing capacity, and asks if there is room for Congress to bring 
uniformity to the fractured landscape of state restrictions.16 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND A PATCHWORK OF RESTRICTIONS 
The right to vote has been called fundamental, but it is not absolute.17 
Congress’s constitutional powers are limited to regulating the “times, places and 
manner” of holding federal elections.18 Accordingly, within the constraints of 
constitutional amendments guaranteeing that the vote will not be abridged by race, 
color, previous condition of servitude,19 sex,20 failure to pay poll tax,21 or age above 
18,22 individual states are free to set their own qualifications to vote.23 (Federal law 
 
11. Id. at § 305(g) (“Access to voter registration and voting for individuals with disabilities”) 
(emphasis added). 
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (fixing the qualifications of voters for federal candidates as the same as 
voters for the largest house of the state legislature, as defined by each state); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 
(granting Congress power to regulate “times, places and manner” of holding federal elections); see also 
infra Part I (discussing provision to states for voter qualifications).  
13. See infra notes 17–28 and accompanying text (discussing the conditional nature of the 
fundamental right to vote).  
14. See infra notes 62–66. 
15. See infra Part III.A (discussing voter fraud). 
16. See infra Part IV.C (discussing Congress’s potential role in bringing uniformity). 
17. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966) (quoting Lassiter v. Northampton 
Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959) (“[T]he right of suffrage ‘is subject to the imposition of state 
standards which are not discriminatory and which do not contravene any restriction that Congress, 
acting pursuant to its constitutional powers, has imposed.’”)). 
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XV; see also Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 
(focusing on literacy tests as a proxy for racial disenfranchisement). 
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV. 
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. 
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; see also Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 543 (2013) (“Outside the 
strictures of the Supremacy Clause, States retain broad autonomy in structuring their governments and 
pursuing legislative objectives . . . . States have ’broad powers to determine the conditions under which 
the right of suffrage may be exercised.’ (quoting Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965)). 
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already acknowledges “mental incapacity” as a reason for states to remove 
registered voters from their voter rolls).24 
Much has been written regarding the right to vote and the level of scrutiny 
applied when this right is limited or denied.25 While the Supreme Court has treated 
the right to vote as nearly sacrosanct,26 perhaps the right to vote is better described 
as conditional: once granted, any attempt to withdraw this right is treated with 
incredible suspicion.27 Because restrictions based on mental competence constitute 
a full denial of the right to vote for those who do not qualify, these restrictions are 
likely subject to strict scrutiny.28 Lower courts have followed suit.29 In the context 
of a challenge to a mental competency restriction, the issue would be whether the 
distinction between competent and incompetent voters serves a compelling state 
interest and that this classification is necessary to achieve that compelling state 
interest.30 If proven, the state must then demonstrate that the means of 
classification is narrowly tailored to achieve that intended result.31 
The state-by-state patchwork of mental competency restrictions ranges from 
statutory to constitutional, or some combination of both. Only thirteen states do 
not have statutory or constitutional restrictions on a person’s right to vote based 
on mental disability.32  Many states have both constitutional and legislative 
restrictions, some of which differ in language.33 Other states have legislation 
expanding or restricting the franchise beyond the state constitution’s delineation 
of voter eligibility.34 Some restrictions are based solely on general categorizations 
of “mental competence.”35 Yet other states require specific judicial determinations 
as part of criminal, probate, or guardianship proceedings.36 
 
24. 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(3)(B) (2018). 
25. See Joshua A. Douglas, Is the Right to Vote Really Fundamental?, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
143, 147–50 (2008). 
26. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (referring to the “political franchise of 
voting” as a “fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights”); see also Harper v. Va. State 
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (“[T]he right to 
exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political 
rights . . . .”). 
27. Douglas, supra note 25, at 147–50. 
28. See, e.g., Harper, 383 U.S. at 670 (striking down poll tax as directly restricting fundamental 
right to vote in state elections); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969) (striking 
down property ownership or parenthood requirement to vote in school board elections as not serving 
compelling interest); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (striking down durational residency 
requirement as directly restricting right to vote). 
29. See Mo. Prot. & Advocacy Servs., Inc. v. Carnahan, 499 F.3d 803, 808 (8th Cir. 2007) 
(acknowledging “close constitutional scrutiny” as the level of review for denial of the right to vote); Doe 
v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 48 (D. Me. 2001) (“[T]he Court bases its due process analysis on a finding 
that the denial of the right to vote is a denial of a fundamental liberty.”); Minn. Voters All. v. Ritchie, 890 
F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1115–17 (D. Minn. 2012) (avoiding Due Process challenge but acknowledging that 
“careful scrutiny” is required when the right to vote is threatened). 
30. See Dunn, 405 U.S. at 343. 
31. Id. 
32. Feinstein & Webber, supra note 5, at 142. 
33. Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 7, at 936–37. 
34. Id. at 937–40. North Dakota, Utah, Alaska, and Florida are jurisdictions where voting laws 
“appear to ignore constitutional provisions in their election laws that specifically delineate those who 
are ineligible to vote.” Id. at 937. 
35. Bindel, supra note 5, at 93. 
36. Id. at 94–97. 
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This patchwork of mental competency restrictions is heavily fractured even 
within state law, as pointed out by scholars.37 For example, the Alaska constitution 
states, “No person may vote who has been judicially determined to be of unsound 
mind unless the disability has been removed.”38 However, the corresponding 
election law that disqualified voters for being of “unsound mind” was repealed in 
1996.39 Alaska’s guardianship statutes also reflect the opposite goal of preserving 
wards’ legal and civil rights, including a provision preventing guardians from 
keeping their wards from voting.40 Layers of restrictions also raise serious questions 
about consistency: is the guardianship adjudication of “unsound mind” in 
Mississippi the same as the determination of “idiots and insane persons” used in 
Mississippi’s constitution and election law?41 
Scholars have exhaustively catalogued these various restrictions and recent 
challenges,42 and any attempt to replicate the quality of that work here would be 
futile. However, the practical effect of this patchwork is that challenges to these 
restrictions must be highly individualized, conducted state-by-state, and are thus 
difficult to bring as part of a national campaign of impact litigation. The next Part 
seeks to look past this patchwork of restrictions to the justifications that may be 
asserted by a state in response to a challenge under strict scrutiny. 
III. WHY RESTRICT THE VOTE BASED ON MENTAL COMPETENCE?  
The Constitutional framework provides space for mental competency 
restrictions in federal and state law. Accordingly, it is not surprising that so many 
states have these restrictions. This Part examines historical justifications for mental 
competency restrictions, and then the interests identified by legal scholars: 
preserving the political community, ensuring an intelligent electorate, and 
preventing voter fraud. 
Advocates for expanding the franchise to the mentally disabled are quick to 
point to the origin of mental competency restrictions. Bindel writes,“[P]ersons with 
diminished mental capacities were disenfranchised since colonial America.”43 
Originally these exclusions came in the form of race, gender, and financial or social 
status restrictions, e.g., property ownership, but as voting qualifications were 
increasingly relaxed, states began to specifically target mentally ill persons or 
persons under guardianship.44 The historic justifications were rooted in deeply held 
 
37. Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 7, at 961; Schiltz, supra note 5, at 102, 105. 
38. ALASKA CONST. art. V, § 2 (West, Westlaw through 2020). 
39. See Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 7, at 938 n.43. 
40. Id. at 951 n.125. 
41. Id. at 977 app. A; Id. at 998 app. B. Notably, this lack of clarity leaves these provisions 
vulnerable to challenges of arbitrariness. See, e.g., Schiltz, supra note 5, at 106. 
42. See generally Nicholas F. Brescia, Modernizing State Voting Laws That Disenfranchise the 
Mentally Disabled with the Aid of Past Suffrage Movements, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 943 (2010); Benjamin O. 
Hoerner, Unfulfilled Promise: Voting Rights for People with Mental Disabilities and the Halving of HAVA’s 
Potential, 20 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 89 (2015); Bindel, supra note 5; Feinstein & Webber, supra note 5; 
Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 7; Schiltz, supra note 5. 
43. Bindel, supra note 5, at 101. 
44. Id. at 102. In 1819, Maine became the first state explicitly prohibiting mentally disabled 
individuals from voting. Id. “[B]y 1880, twenty-six of the thirty-eight states had such provisions.” Id. 
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principles, such as the idea that only those of sufficient intelligence should be 
allowed to vote,45 that disenfranchising socially undesirable people (i.e., the 
persons with diminished mental capacity) protected both the would-be voter and 
society from the negative ramifications of their choices,46 and that decreasing the 
total electorate would provide political parties with electoral advantages.47 
As civil rights and disability rights have progressed, historic justifications for 
disenfranchisement have eroded, but evidently mental disabilities stand apart from 
other disabilities as applied to voting rights. The United States Supreme Court has 
acknowledged a “‘lengthy and tragic history’ of segregation and discrimination” of 
the mentally disabled.48 Federal laws also have provided more protection to 
individuals with disabilities through legislation like the Voting Rights Act,49 the 
Nursing Home Reform Act of 1987,50 the National Voter Registration Act of 1993,51 
and the Americans with Disabilities Act.52 These laws have focused on accessibility 
for those otherwise qualified to vote.53 But at the same time, federal law continues 
to carve out room for state-based restrictions on voting registration based on 
mental capacity.54 “[W]e believe that we are throwing off the yokes of prejudice 
and myth by adopting broad federal antidiscrimination protections such as the 
ADA,” write Schriner et al., “But we cling to distinctions when we believe they really 
‘matter,’ such as those found in the state laws governing electoral participation.”55 
Why? Today, mental competency restrictions on the right to vote are likely to 
be justified by three rationales considered by the Supreme Court in other 
contexts.56 Scholars have examined justifications presented in election law cases 
decided by the United States Supreme Court,57 and have identified compelling 
 
45. Id. at 104. See also Brescia, supra note 42, at 953–54; Hoerner, supra note 42, at 108 (“[W]hile 
the debate around the intellectual and moral capacity of voters primarily centered around women and 
African-Americans, it is likely that the states’ adoption of disability-centric exclusions was a political 
consequence of concerns about the persons with mental disabilities’ capacity to intelligently, and thus 
legitimately, vote”). 
46. Bindel, supra note 5, at 103–04; see also Brescia, supra note 42, at 957–59 (observing that 
historical treatment and public perception reflect the notion “that mentally disabled persons cannot be 
full members of society”).  
47. Bindel, supra note 5, at 105–06. 
48. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 461 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring) 
(quoting Univ. of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)). 
49. 52 U.S.C. §§ 20101–07 (1965); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (1971); 52 U.S.C. 
§ 10508 (2020). 
50. See 42 C.F.R. §§483.10(a)(1)–(2) (2019) (implementing the Nursing Home Reform Act of 1987, 
which was passed as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987). 
51. National Voter Registration Act, 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501–11 (1993). 
52. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (2008). 
53. See, e.g., Voting Accessibility for Elderly and Handicapped Act of 1984, 52 U.S.C. § 20101 
(2018); See also Rabia Belt, Contemporary Voting Rights Controversies through the Lens of Disability, 68 
STAN. L. REV. 1491, 1499–1505 (2016) (describing the various federal statutory protections for people 
with disabilities in exercising voting rights). 
54. See 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(3)(B) (2018) (allowing voter registration to be canceled “as provided 
by State law, by reason of criminal conviction or mental incapacity”).  
55. Kay Schriner, Lisa Ochs & Todd Shields, Democratic Dilemmas: Notes on the ADA and Voting 
Rights of People with Cognitive and Emotional Impairments, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 437, 439 (2000). 
56. Pamela S. Karlan, Framing the Voting Rights Claims of Cognitively Impaired Individuals, 38 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 917, 924 (2007). 
57. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Purcell v. 
Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006). 
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government interests justifying disenfranchisement: ensuring an intelligent 
electorate; and the preservation of the political community, including prevention 
of voter fraud.58 
As a preliminary matter, the government interest of ensuring an intelligent 
electorate was approved of in cases predating the Voting Rights Act’s restriction on 
literacy tests.59 Accordingly, the validity of this interest is suspect in the context of 
heightened scrutiny.60 “[W]e have recognized since the time of the Federalist 
Papers that voters will often behave selfishly, prejudicially, and irrationally,” Karlan 
writes, “The fact that voters who are cognitively impaired may not process 
information in a sophisticated or entirely rational manner may separate them only 
in degree—if even that—from the remainder of the electorate.”61 It is unclear how 
a voter’s knowledgeability or intelligence on election issues or candidates is a 
compelling interest under heightened scrutiny. 
The remaining, more legitimate interest is rooted in preserving the integrity 
of the election process.62 Professor Karlan calls this interest preservation of the 
political community, and considers this interest to subsume two goals: identifying 
whether voters have (or appreciate) an electoral preference at all, and preventing 
voter fraud.63 “Permitting individuals with cognitive impairments so severe that 
they are unaware of the very nature of the process in which they are participating 
to vote may undermine that conception [of a political community] in two ways, one 
conceptual and one practical.”64 Conceptually, a participant in the political process 
who does not understand or appreciate the significance of participation—a voter 
with “no conscious intention of expressing a preference designed to affect electoral 
outcomes”—appears unable to cast a vote meaningful to her.65 On the other hand, 
there is also a “practical” goal in preventing voter fraud: “Including within the 
electorate individuals who do not understand the nature of voting creates a pool of 
potential votes that might be cast by anyone with the ability to gain access to those 
individuals’ ballots . . . .”66 These two goals reflect a state’s need to preserve a 
political community where voters are invested in the outcome of the electoral 
process. The political community needs voters who have a preference which they 
intend to express by participating, and whose expression is not hijacked by others’ 
preferences. 
Of course, just because the Supreme Court identified the goal of preserving 
electoral integrity as a compelling government interest does not mean this interest 
will automatically justify competency-based restrictions. Justifications previously 
relied upon to deny the vote have been found to no longer be compelling, if even 
 
58. Karlan, supra note 56, at 924–25. 
59. See Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959). 
60. Lassiter predated the application of strict scrutiny. See Karlan, supra note 56, at 924. 
61. Id. at 925. 
62. See, e.g., Burdick, 504 U.S. at 441 (“[T]he right to vote is the right to participate in an electoral 
process that is necessarily structured to maintain the integrity of the democratic system.”); Purcell, 549 
U.S. at 4 (“A State indisputably has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election 
process.”) (quotation omitted). 
63. Karlan, supra note 56, at 925. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 925. 
66. Id. 
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legitimate.67 The next Part examines voter fraud and the perception of electoral 
system integrity, asking whether and how mental competency restrictions do 
further the governmental interest of preserving electoral integrity. 
IV. (HOW) DO MENTAL COMPETENCY RESTRICTIONS PRESERVE ELECTORAL 
INTEGRITY?  
If the integrity of the election process is threatened by allowing persons to 
vote without restriction based on mental capacity, a vital question is whether and 
how the election process is threatened by voters deemed mentally incompetent. 
As Karlan highlights, a practical goal is voter fraud prevention.68 The most obvious 
form of voter fraud may be the abuse of absentee ballots earmarked for elderly or 
disabled residents in long-term care facilities.69 A more nuanced form of voter fraud 
is the threat of undue influence, intentional or otherwise, resulting in duplicated 
votes based on the views of those who assist or influence the voter.70 But a number 
of studies indicate that voter fraud itself is not a widespread phenomenon.71 There 
must be something more than the threat of stolen votes. 
The United States Supreme Court has not yet been asked to decide if electoral 
integrity is eroded simply by allowing someone with diminished mental capacity to 
vote.72 Scholarship is quick to recite that the interest of preserving the integrity of 
the election process is tied to voter fraud prevention.73 But as the Court wrote in 
Purcell, what is key to the integrity of the election process is the perception thereof: 
“Confidence in the integrity of our electoral processes is essential to the functioning 
of our participatory democracy . . . . ‘[T]he right of suffrage can be denied by a 
debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by 
wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.’”74 This Part will briefly discuss 
how voter fraud is measured, examine perception of electoral integrity as the true 
measure of electoral integrity, and conclude that for the act of voting to retain 
meaning, the electoral system must appear sound, regardless of its actual 
susceptibility to voter fraud. 
A. Voter Fraud and Competency-Based Voting Restrictions 
To call voter fraud controversial would be an immense understatement. Voter 
fraud has been a concern for years and galvanizes voters, policymakers, and the 
 
67. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, 
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 954–60 (2002) (describing the legal paradigm justifying 
systemic discrimination against women). 
68. Karlan, supra note 56, at 925; see also Steven J. Schwartz, Abolishing Competency as a 
Construction of Difference: A Radical Proposal to Promote the Equality of Persons with Disabilities, 47 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 867, 871 (1993) (“There is, of course, an important value in safeguarding the democratic 
process against corruption or undue influence.”). 
69. Belt, supra note 53, at 1505–06. 
70. Karlan, supra note 56, at 925. 
71. Belt, supra note 53, at 1505 n.90 and accompanying text. 
72. See Nina A. Kohn, Preserving Voting Rights in Long-Term Care Institutions: Facilitating 
Resident Voting While Maintaining Election Integrity, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1065, 1089 (2007). 
73. Id. (citing Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006)). 
74. Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4 (italics added) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)). 
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press alike.75 On one hand, some claim that voter fraud is widespread and being 
covered up.76 On the other hand, scholarly sources assert that allegations of 
noncitizen voting, “dead voters,” or other voter registration fraud simply do not pan 
out.77  
Social scientists Hood and Gillespie have acknowledged the difficulty of 
measuring voter fraud: “[T]he very nature of the subject matter, of course, like 
other illegal, immoral, or irregular activities, makes it unlikely that conclusive 
documentary evidence of fraud will be found.”78 Nevertheless, “[i]f fraud exists, 
however, it is potentially observable.”79 Hood and Gillespie, for example, studied 
voter fraud in the 2006 general election in Georgia, focusing on 66 votes allegedly 
cast by “dead voters.”80 Hood and Gillespie were able to narrow questionable votes 
to a mere 5, a tiny fraction of the total ballots cast in the election.81 “Most serious 
studies agree that instances of in-person voter fraud are exceedingly rare and that 
there have not been very many convictions for fraudulent voting. But these studies 
do not claim that voter fraud is totally non-existent; rather, they claim that 
instances of it are minuscule in number.”82 
Even given a way to measure (and prevent) voting fraud, specific contexts 
such as long-term care facilities or nursing homes pose a high risk.83 Professor Belt 
notes the phenomenon of “‘granny farming,’ where people with disabilities and the 
elderly are signed up to vote with premarked ballots without their consent.”84 This 
kind of voter fraud has triggered more founded allegations than the kinds that Hood 
 
75. See, e.g., Justin McCarthy, Four in Five Americans Support Voter ID Laws, Early Voting, GALLUP 
NEWS: POLITICS (Aug. 22, 2016), https://news.gallup.com/poll/194741/four-five-americans-support-
voter-laws-early-voting.aspx; PUB. INTEREST LEGAL FOUND., ALIEN INVASION IN VIRGINIA: THE DISCOVERY AND 
COVERUP OF NONCITIZEN REGISTRATION AND VOTING, VIRGINIA VOTERS ALLIANCE (2016), 
https://publicinterestlegal.org/files/Report_Alien-Invasion-in-Virginia.pdf; Hans A. von Spakovsky, 
Justice Department Blind to Virginia Voter Fraud, HERITAGE FOUND. (May 30, 2014), 
https://www.heritage.org/election-integrity/commentary/justice-department-blind-virginia-voter-
fraud; Debbie Siegelbaum, GOP Says 5,000 Non-Citizens Voting in Colorado a ‘Wake-Up Call’ for States, 
HILL (Mar. 31, 2011), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/153079-gop-says-5000-non-citizens-voting-
in-colorado-a-wake-up-call-for-states. 
76. See sources cited supra note 75. 
77. Justin Levitt, The Truth About Voter Fraud, Brennan Ctr. for Justice 14 (2007), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/The%20Truth%20About%20Voter%20Fraud.
pdf; Christopher Famighetti et al., Noncitizen Voting: The Missing Millions, Brennan Ctr. for Justice 
(2017), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/2017_NoncitizenVoting_Final.pdf; see 
also Resources on Voter Fraud Claims, Brennan Ctr. for Justice (June 26, 2017), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/resources-voter-fraud-claims. 
78. M.V. Hood III & William Gillespie, They Just Do Not Vote Like They Used To: A Methodology 
to Empirically Assess Election Fraud, 93 SOC. SCI. Q. 76, 77 (2012) (quoting Howard W. Allen & Kay Warren 
Allen, Vote Fraud and Data Validity, in JEROME M. CLUBB, ANALYZING ELECTORAL HISTORY: A GUIDE TO THE STUDY 
OF AMERICAN VOTING BEHAVIOR 155–56 (Jerome M. Clubb, William Flanigan, and Nancy Zingale, eds., 1981)). 
79. Id. at 77. 
80. Id. at 81–84. 
81. Id. at 84, 82–92. 
82. Eugene D. Mazo, Finding Common Ground on Voter ID Laws, 49 U. MEM. L. REV. 1233, 1246 
(2019). 
83. See, e.g., Amy Smith & Charles P. Sabatino, Voting by Residents of Nursing Homes and 
Assisted Living Facilities: State Law Accommodations, 26 BIFOCAL 1, 1 (2004). 
84. Belt, supra note 53, at 1505–06. 
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and Gillespie studied in Georgia.85 These types of voter fraud are harder to measure 
and address; distinguishing “proper” from “improper assistance” given to elderly 
voters is difficult without statutory guidelines for voting assistance.86 Scholars 
reiterate that this type of voter fraud can still be prevented by better education, 
greater presence and supervision by election officials, stricter compliance with 
existing statutory protections in federal law,87 and creative solutions like “mobile 
voting.”88 
The difficulty of distinguishing between “proper” and “improper assistance” 
gives rise to the hardest question about voter fraud and mental competency: does 
preserving the vote for those with mental disabilities preserve votes for others to 
take advantage of through undue influence? This question raises with it very 
subjective inquiries: does the voter have an opinion or preference? Does the voter 
want to express it? Does the voter understand that her expression may change the 
outcome? This is almost impossible to measure,89 especially for voters who may be 
nonverbal or only have limited vocabulary.90 Nevertheless, even as remedies are 
proposed in the context of voter fraud in long-term care facilities, some scholars 
agree that the capacity of these voters should be assessed.91 This is an “underlying” 
assumption “that someone must or will capacity-test residents in order to ensure 
the integrity of the electoral process and that the primary questions are who should 
do it and how.”92 Measuring how many votes were unduly influenced by family 
members, well-meaning friends, or even strangers with partisan agendas presents 
a massive black hole of zero data, at worst, and anecdata at best. 
B. Houston, We Have a Perception Problem: Electoral Integrity 
Despite the difficulty of measuring voter fraud connected with persons with 
diminished mental capacity, concern about this kind of voter fraud appears merited 
to the extent that others may take advantage of another’s vote. This concern 
reflects a significant concept about the American democratic process: the 
inalienability of an individual’s vote.93 Scholars like Cass Sunstein propose that 
delegating, selling, or assigning the legal right to vote undermines the value of this 
right itself.94 Practically speaking, allowing even the well-meaning family member 
 
85. See Jessica A. Fay, Elderly Electors Go Postal: Ensuring Absentee Ballot Integrity for Older 
Voters, 13 ELDER L.J. 453, 454–55 (2005).   
86. Id. at 464–65, 467 (citing Womack v. Foster, 8 S.W.3d 854 (2000)). 
87. Kohn, supra note 72, at 1092. 
88. Id. at 1100–03. 
89. Hurme and Appelbaum have proposed capacity tests to try to measure this, elaborated on 
infra notes 133–37, but these tests focus solely on gauging decisional capacity, not measuring the chance 
or rate of fraudulent voting. See Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 7, at 960–74.  
90. Nonverbal voters have reported discrimination at polling places. Belt, supra note 53, at 1498 
(describing an experience by a nonverbal Michigan voter with a physical disability where poll workers 
questioned his right to vote). 
91. See, e.g., Denise Grady, Change Urged for Nursing-Home Voters, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2004), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/15/politics/campaign/change-urged-for-nursinghome-
voters.html; Fay, supra note 85, at 483–84. 
92. Kohn, supra note 72, at 1098–99. 
93. See, e.g., Andrew Tutt, Choosing Representatives by Proxy Voting, 116 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 
61, 77–79 (2016). 
94. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 964–65 (1996). 
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to influence a diminished-capacity voter’s choice threatens to offend this concept. 
The ethical considerations presented by members of the American Medical 
Association focus on the voter’s autonomy of the voter and a deep concern about 
“proxy” voting: “Although a person has the prerogative to vote as another person 
recommends, the person cannot ‘assign’ his or her right to vote to someone else.”95 
That undue influence may affect the outcome of an election itself simply adds insult 
to psychic injury.96 As Hurme and Appelbaum note, “[T]he possibility cannot be 
excluded that incompetently cast ballots could affect the outcome of close 
elections, especially at local levels, where the pool of voters is restricted.”97 
Further, even if a voter is not unduly influenced, his ability to understand and 
appreciate his participation in the political process contributes to the overall 
perception of the legitimacy and integrity of the electoral process. Mental 
competency restrictions draw a line between a competent voter and an 
incompetent voter, shoring up system confidence. The Supreme Court explicitly 
stated in Purcell v. Gonzalez, “Confidence in the integrity of our electoral processes 
is essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy.”98 In other words, 
voters’ confidence in the integrity of the electoral process is as concerning to the 
Court as the actual integrity of the electoral process.99 
Scholars have theorized that the election process is group-driven, such that 
the involvement of mentally disabled voters negatively affects perception of 
electoral integrity. The “meaningfulness” of the right to vote is defined by 
appreciation of the electoral process and the desire to participate in it.100 Exercise 
of the right to vote is incentivized and reinforced by a voter’s potential contribution 
to the general good.101 Achen and Bartels propose that practical execution of 
elections requires a collective process where voters are reminded of their partisan 
identities and are mobilized “to support their group at the polls.”102 When voters 
are not sufficiently mobilized, even if they want to participate and are incentivized 
to affect the outcome of an election, the result has been described as the “paradox 
 
95. Jason H. Karlawish et al., Addressing the Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues Raised by Voting by 
Persons with Dementia, 292 JAMA 1345, 1347 (2004). 
96. The significance of an individual vote in the context of the entire system has been questioned 
by voters and scholars alike. See, e.g., Giovanni Russonello, Voters Fear Their Ballot Won’t Count, Poll 
Shows, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/26/us/politics/voter-fraud-
poll.html. Economists Gelman, Silver, and Edlin point out the tiny chance that a single vote may be 
decisive in a presidential election: on average, an American voter has, at most, about 1 in 60 million 
chance that a randomly-selected voter would be decisive. Andrew Gelman, Nate Silver & Aaron Edlin, 
What is the Probability Your Vote Will Make a Difference?, 50 ECON. INQUIRY 321 (2012). 
97. Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 7, at 964. 
98. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (emphasis added). 
99. See id.  
100. See, e.g., Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 7, at 966 n.209. 
101. Aaron Edlin, Andrew Gelman & Noah Kaplan, Voting as a Rational Choice: Why and How 
People Vote to Improve the Well-Being of Others (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
13562, 2007), https://www.nber.org/papers/w13562.pdf. 
102. Christopher H. Achen & Larry M. Bartels, Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not 
Produce Responsive Government 311–16 (Tali Mendelberg ed., 2016). 
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of not voting.”103 There must be sufficient reason for a voter to “buy into” the 
electoral process.104 
This buy-in by prospective voters, i.e., what overcomes the inertia of a 
disinterested voter, may be eroded if the opportunity to vote is not perceived as 
significant enough, or if their comparatively “more rational” vote may be canceled 
by a vote by a mentally incompetent voter. “Why is it worth spending time analyzing 
the choices on the ballot, a competent voter might ask, when the state is willing to 
allow even clearly incompetent people to participate in what one might conclude is 
not a terribly important process?”105 
 Thus, from the perspective of a state administration crafting an electoral 
process, mental competency restrictions preserve the integrity of the process in 
practical and symbolic ways. First, to the extent that voter fraud is an actual threat, 
mental competency restrictions may prevent undesirable effects on close elections, 
“especially at local levels, where the pool of voters is restricted.”106 Second, the 
perception of electoral integrity, regardless of the actual threat of fraud, is 
symbolically preserved by affirming the importance of the personal, non-assignable 
vote—something called into question where people with diminished capacity are 
vulnerable to undue influence. Electoral integrity is further reinforced when voters 
“buy in” to the electoral process itself—when they are mobilized to publicly engage 
in a system that promises to reflect their meaningful choices. Mental competency 
restrictions may symbolically protect the system by serving as a safeguard against 
votes cast by those who do not understand, appreciate, or desire to participate in 
the electoral system.107 
V. THE DEVIL IS IN THE DEFINITIONS: WHAT IS A NARROWLY TAILORED MENTAL 
COMPETENCY RESTRICTION?  
 Given the practical and symbolic functions performed by mental 
competency restrictions, the proliferation of such restrictions makes more sense. 
However, states with mental competency restrictions—despite the arguably 
compelling interest in preserving electoral integrity—still must be narrowly tailored 
 
103. See Thomas R. Palfrey & Howard Rosenthal, Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty, 
79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 62, 62 (1985). 
104. Political science scholar Adam Winkler has advanced an “instrumental” theory of voting, 
proposing that the Supreme Court has treated “voting [as] a specialized activity that has value only to 
the extent that it enables citizens to advance or defend narrowly defined political objectives - in contrast 
to the broader, generalized political notions discussed above - where such narrow objectives can be 
formed and analyzed in an educated, knowledgeable manner.” Adam Winkler, Expressive Voting, 68 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 330, 342 (1993). This has been theorized as why the Supreme Court is more willing to 
“devalue voting” when a voter’s ballot is not cast in such a way to pursue “narrow, informed policy 
options.” Bindel, supra note 5, at 112 (citing Winkler, supra at 342). 
105. Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 7, at 964. 
106. Id. 
107. Scholars who propose standards for determining voting capacity tend to focus on the 
ability of a voter to understand the nature and effect of voting, as well as the ability of the voter to form 
and express a personal choice in the voting process. Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 7, at 964–65; see 
Karlawish et al., supra note 95, at 1347. Even Schwartz, a proponent of abolishing all mental competency 
restrictions, concedes that “[w]here an individual can participate in the electoral process by selecting a 
candidate or position, the issue of competency should be irrelevant to the person’s right to vote.” 
Schwartz, supra note 68, at 872 (emphasis added). Thus, the ability to form and express a voting choice 
still presents a litmus test. Id. 
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to meet that interest.108 Aspects of these restrictions including delineating eligible 
from ineligible voters, establishing a standard for capacity, and the logistics of 
administering such standards. This Part examines what constitutes a “narrowly 
tailored” mental competency restriction, then briefly describes proposed standards 
for mental competency restrictions, before asking what Congress’s role might be in 
making a mental competency standard uniform. 
A. Narrow Tailoring 
The patchwork of state restrictions reflects widely different language, 
standards, and mechanisms. Challenges to these restrictions highlight problematic 
aspects. These include arbitrary distinctions, as identified in the Maine decision Doe 
v. Rowe.109 In Doe v. Rowe, the Maine federal district court was asked to decide if 
Maine’s constitutional amendment—disenfranchising those “under guardianship 
for reasons of mental illness”110—violated the Equal Protection Clause.111 “Mental 
illness” was defined elsewhere as a very narrow cause of incapacity, but other 
incapacitated persons without guardians were not disenfranchised.112 The court 
first held this distinction was arbitrary—those under guardianship and those not—
because incapacitated persons not under guardianship were allowed to vote 
“regardless of whether or not they possess the ability to understand the nature and 
effect of voting.”113 Further, even though the state argued that “mental illness” 
should be read broadly to include “all mental capacities,” the court held that the 
language of “‘mental illness’ [could not] serve as a proxy for mental incapacity with 
regards to voting.”114 
Accordingly, restrictions that arbitrarily distinguish between incapacitated 
people based on guardianship status may, following Doe v. Rowe, be susceptible to 
Equal Protection challenges as an over- and underinclusive classification.115 Other 
restrictions susceptible to challenges may include those that do not specify who 
adjudicates competency, or restrictions that use archaic or imprecise words to 
disqualify voters.116 Further, the importance of the right to vote mandates judicial 
 
108. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 356–360 (1972). 
109. Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 52 (D. Me. 2001). 
110. ME. CONST. art. II, § 1 (West, Westlaw through 2019). 
111. Doe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 37. The court was also asked to find that this violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 46. The court agreed because there were no 
protections in guardianship proceedings for mentally ill persons to be informed of the 
disenfranchisement consequences. Id. at 48–51. 
112. Id. at 43–45, 47. 
113. Id. at 52. 
114. Id. at 55. 
115. See In re the Guardianship of Erickson, No. 27-GC-PR-09-57, 2012 Minn. Dist. LEXIS 193, at 
*26–28 (4th Jud. Dist. 2012) (holding Minnesota’s categorical disenfranchisement of persons under 
guardianship by reason of mental illness was simultaneously under- and over-inclusive). 
116. See Bindel, supra note 5, at 93–94; see also Carroll v. Cobb, 354 A.2d 355, 359, 360 n.12 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (observing that a county clerk or election official at a poll is unable to 
make voting capacity determinations in the midst of the election process and recognizing the outmoded 
nature of archaic term of “insane person” or “idiot”). 
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determination of mental incompetence under the Due Process clause.117 This 
judicial determination likely should be an independent evaluation of “the voting 
capacity of each ward at the time of the hearing on a petition for guardianship, and 
on subsequent occasions as needed or requested.”118 States that explicitly preserve 
a ward’s right to vote unless this right is expressly removed through a court’s finding 
of no voting capacity are likely narrowly tailored to satisfy the rigors of the Equal 
Protection Clause and the procedural protections required for due process.119  
B. Measuring Voting Capacity 
An individualized judicial determination of voting capacity is most likely to be 
deemed narrowly tailored to achieve the interest of preserving electoral 
integrity.120 Less clear, however, is the actual standard for voting capacity. Most 
states do not define a standard for capacity, and very few courts have been called 
upon to define it.121 
Proposed standards largely align with the standard loosely articulated in Doe 
v. Rowe by the Maine District Court: measuring a voter’s understanding of the 
“nature and effect of voting.”122 Legal capacity in the first instance extends to 
capacity to do something as well as capacity to decide something.123 Competency 
or capacity standards, write Hurme and Appelbaum, incorporate 
a person[’s] . . . ability to: understand the information relevant to the decision 
to be made, appreciate the implications of that information for his or her own 
situation, reason about the information in a manner that compares the options, and 
choose the desired option from the list of possibilities.124 
 
117. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348–49 (1976) (setting out multifactor test for 
procedural challenges to deprivation of property or liberty, emphasizing notice and opportunity for an 
evidentiary hearing in cases where there is jeopardy of a serious loss); see also Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 
2d 35, 48–51 (D. Me. 2001); In re the Guardianship of Erickson, No. 27-GC-PR-09-57, 2012 Minn. Dist. 
LEXIS 193, at *28–34 (4th Jud. Dist. 2012) (concluding that the probate court, in making guardianship 
determinations, was “uniquely situated to analyze [] whether a ward [could] thoughtfully and 
responsibly vote”). But see Bindel, supra note 5, at 95–97 (noting that, while a probate court may be 
equipped to make voting capacity determinations, “other, more immediately pressing aspects of the 
person’s capabilities” may be the court’s chief focus). 
118. In re the Guardianship of Erickson, No. 27-GC-PR-09-57, 2012 Minn. Dist. LEXIS 193, at *29 
(4th Jud. Dist. 2012). 
119. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 1701 (West 2019) (requiring that court must find a 
mentally incompetent person to have a severe cognitive impairment precluding exercise of basic voting 
judgment); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-105 (2019) (preserving all civil rights of “incapacitated 
persons” except those explicitly removed); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-5-301.1, 45-5-312 (West 2019) 
(preserving all rights of “incapacitated persons” except those expressly limited, and requiring “legal 
insanity” to be ascertained by certification by guardianship court); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-703 
(2013) (allowing guardian or conservator to petition to determine voting competency to restore right to 
vote); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 97.041 (West 2019) (requiring guardianship court to determine if incapacitated 
person retains the right to vote).  
120. See supra Parts III–IV. 
121. Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 7, at 961. 
122. Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 56 (D. Me. 2001). As Hurme and Appelbaum observe, a 
1907 Illinois challenge to a voter’s competency was rejected “because the voter understood the nature 
of his act and had interacted in a rational fashion with persons at the polling site.” Hurme & Appelbaum, 
supra note 7, at 961 (citing Welch v. Shumway, 83 N.E. 549, 558 (Ill. 1907)). 
123. Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 7, at 962–63. 
124. Id. at 963. 
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Scholars like Karlawish also emphasize that for the purposes of gauging 
competency to vote, “The critical issue is whether the person is able to express a 
choice.”125 
 The American Bar Association approved a Voting Recommendation in 2007 
which proposed the following criteria for exclusion: 
a. “The exclusion is based on a determination by a court of competent 
jurisdiction;” 
b. “Appropriate due process protections have been afforded;” 
c. The court finds that “the person cannot communicate, with or 
without accommodations, a specific desire to participate in the voting 
process;” and 
d. The findings are established by clear and convincing evidence.126 
As scholar Brescia writes, this recommendation appears narrowly tailored 
because it is not a categorical disenfranchisement, and because it requires an 
individualized judicial determination.127 The “clear and convincing” standard of 
proof provides even greater protection.128 
This recommendation has been met with varied support.129 In particular, the 
competency standard suggested appears predicated on a voter’s expressed desire 
to participate in the voting process, not “the level of cognition necessary to 
understand the effect of the vote.”130 Further, the fact that so many eligible voters 
choose not to vote—expressively or not—makes rather arbitrary the distinction 
between a capable voter who has no desire to vote but has the right to do so, and 
an incapable voter who has no desire to vote but does not have the right to do so.131 
Quantification of voting capacity presents an obstacle that Dr. Paul 
Appelbaum, professor of psychiatry, acknowledges is “an exercise in policy, not 
science . . . . Essentially, this is a determination regarding allocation of the risk of 
error.”132 Taking this into consideration, Appelbaum and colleagues developed the 
Competence Assessment Tool for Voting (CAT-V), testing the various decisional 
 
125. Karlawish et al., supra note 95, at 1347 (italics in original). This aspect of the standard 
proposed by Karlawish is mirrored in Washington’s voting competency statute, which adds the 
requirement that the person be able to make an “individual choice.” WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.88.010(5) 
(West 2019). 
126. See Recommendations of the Symposium, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 861, 863 (2007), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_aging/recommendations.pdf 
[hereinafter ABA Recommendation]. 
127. Brescia, supra note 42, at 964. 
128. Id. But see Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 51 n.20 (D. Me. 2001). 
129. See Schiltz, supra note 5, at 113; Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 7, at 966 n.209; Brescia, 
supra note 42, at 964. Cf. Hoerner, supra note 42, at 126–27 (observing this standard to be “a relatively 
low bar for voting right eligibility”); Bindel, supra note 5, at 129–34 (pointing out a number of drawbacks, 
particularly in administration). 
130. Hoerner, supra note 42, at 127. 
131. The economic theory of democracy, advanced by Anthony Downs, poses the “paradox of 
not voting” where eligible voters decide not to vote, paradoxically, because the costs outweigh the 
perceived benefits. See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957).  
132. Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 7, at 962 (citing PAUL S. APPELBAUM & THOMAS G. GUTHEIL, 
CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY & THE LAW 183–84 (4th ed. 2007)). 
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aspects of voting and attempting to quantify overall capacity to vote.133 This 
exercise boils down to three questions that explore how well subjects understand 
the nature to vote, how well they understand the effect of voting, and their ability 
to choose among the candidates.134 The test scores range between 0 and 6.135 
The simplicity of the CAT-V questions and potential scores is a double-edged 
sword. The conclusion to be drawn from extreme scores on either side of the 
spectrum is clear, but where should the line be drawn with intermediate scores?136 
Hurme and Appelbaum acknowledge that this challenge may preclude use of a 
competency test like CAT-V as the definitive instrument for denial of the right to 
vote, but suggest that they might be used in long-term care facilities as a trigger for 
referral to a neutral decision-maker.137 
C. A Way Forward: Can Congress Level the Playing Field? 
The government interests achieved by competency-based 
disenfranchisement are undoubtedly rooted in society’s perception of the electoral 
process, depending far less on actual rates of voter fraud, and more on ill-defined 
concepts of integrity. One might ask why competency-based restrictions should 
continue, if perception, not reality, is the defining factor. Nevertheless, the integrity 
of the electoral process is increasingly divided and deeply politicized, and 
unquestionably states are incentivized to shore up both actual and perceived 
electoral integrity. If competency-based restrictions persist—and I contend they 
will—a national approach should be seriously considered. It may eliminate the 
patchwork of constitutional and statutory standards for disenfranchisement, and 
may level the playing field for voters with mental disabilities. 
As noted, a mental competency standard addressing concerns about the 
integrity of the electoral system is hard to formulate. How a state defines its 
governmental interest in maintaining competency-based restrictions forecasts 
what that state’s mental competency standard will prioritize.138 Accordingly, there 
is significant room for interpretation and policy advocacy in each state. However, 
Congress may be able to achieve uniformity by providing a mental competency 
standard inextricably tied to a governmental interest in maintaining electoral 
integrity. 
Again, Congress’s role in establishing voting qualifications is limited.139 Thus, 
Congress’s ability to, for example, outright ban mental competency qualifications is 
 
133. Id. at 966–70. The instrument itself was developed for a small study (n=33) on the capacity 
to vote of persons with Alzheimer’s Disease. See Paul Appelbaum et al., The Capacity to Vote of Persons 
with Alzheimer’s Disease, 162 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 2094 (2005). 
134. Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 7, at 967–68. 
135. Id. at 969. 
136. See id. at 970. This comparison raises a classification question about why not all voters 
would be subjected to a similar assessment; see also Schwartz, supra note 68, at 871 (“Using a standard 
of the average voter as the reference for assessing the acceptability of an exclusionary rule, one would 
have to determine what level of information and understanding is the bare minimum to qualify for 
becoming a qualified voter.”). 
137. Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 7, at 973. 
138. See generally id. 
139. See supra notes 17–27 and accompanying text. 
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vulnerable to Elections Clause challenges for overreach.140 However, Congress 
could frame a uniform mental competency standard as a manner in which a 
qualification is determined, something arguably within Congress’s Elections Clause 
power. Federal legislation likely could prohibit guardianship as a default, categorical 
trigger for disenfranchisement, requiring instead an individualized judicial 
determination, or could establish a uniform mental competency standard to be 
applied. Legislation could also condition election administration funds on the 
adoption of a uniform mental competency standard.141 
Legal scholar Hoerner suggests sweeping voting legislation to “create a federal 
definition of voter competency.”142 In particular, he suggests a standard that would 
“categorically disqualify all individuals who are under a judicially determined 
guardianship order.”143 However, the court adjudicating guardianship would be 
required to ensure that proper notice was given of the loss of the right to vote, and 
if the parties expressed the desire to preserve the right to vote for the ward, “to 
effectively retain the right, the individual would then have to pass [a] court-
administered functional test that mirrors the level of cognitive rigor of voting, 
namely (1) understanding the process and (2) understanding the effect of the 
vote.”144 Hoerner suggests that this standard would affirmatively “grant all citizens 
in the United States the right to vote,” and would avoid many of the concerns about 
voter fraud or undue influence because, while a guardian could still attempt to 
preserve the right for a ward who is not sufficiently competent, the individual 
functional test would be the final determination.145 This standard would “presume[] 
the voting capacity of all individuals, crystallizing the right to vote as a fundamental 
right and would inextricably incorporate a mix of functional and categorical 
disenfranchisement tests.”146 
A federal definition for voter competency is a step in the right direction, as it 
would provide the necessary uniformity for a would-be voter considering 
guardianship in one state to be aware of legal consequences of moving to another 
state. The requirement of a judicial determination at every step in the 
disenfranchisement process is also promising; where fundamental (or quasi-
fundamental) rights are concerned, it is beyond question that a judge is the most 
qualified decision-maker.147 Use of a functional test is also heartening, given that a 
vital part of the voting process is a voter’s capacity to understand the opportunity 
to choose, and to choose. 
 
140. The ongoing battle about felon disenfranchisement provides an example of challenges to 
an outright ban on mental competency restrictions. See, e.g., Legal Analysis of Congress’ Constitutional 
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141. For a discussion on the federal government’s authority to use the Spending Clause to 
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146. Id. at 127. 
147. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
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However, categorical disqualification followed by an avenue for 
reinstatement falls on the wrong side of presumption. Differences between judges’ 
use of full and limited guardianships, for example, meant that Missouri purged 
more than 10,000 registered voters during the 2008–2016 election cycles because 
these voters had been legally determined as “mentally incompetent.”148 (This was 
more than twice as many purged for the same reason in Kentucky; Missouri judges 
established full guardianships far more than limited guardianships).149 A better 
approach may treat the entry of a guardianship order as a checkpoint at which an 
interested party—likely the guardian—could then recommend the ward undergo a 
simple functional test like the CAT-V suggested by Hurme and Appelbaum.150 If a 
ward attained an extreme score suggesting she did not understand or appreciate 
the nature of the electoral process, a judge would then determine by clear and 
convincing evidence whether she was qualified to vote.151 A ward seeking to have 
her vote restored—or acquire it for the first time—would need only petition the 
court to undergo the same test, such that the criteria to maintain and regain the 
vote would be the same. This approach would keep in clear focus a presumption, 
afforded to otherwise qualified voters, that the right to vote should be retained. 
Of course, no matter how well-crafted a federal uniform approach may be, 
the ultimate deciding factor would be its ability to withstand a U.S. constitutional 
challenge under the Elections Clause. For that reason, an approach that does not 
overstep the boundaries of the Elections Clause might follow in the footsteps of the 
Uniform Law Commission and rely solely on bipartisan state support to pass 
legislation. However, given the vast number of state constitutional provisions, such 
an approach poses practical obstacles because many state constitutions would 
need to be amended or repealed. Nevertheless, however achieved, a uniform 
approach would eliminate guesswork, provide predictability for those considering 
the guardianship process, and level the playing field for voters with mental 
disabilities. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 The patchwork of competency-based restrictions poses a significant 
obstacle to the uniformity of the right to vote. Given the government interest in 
preserving the integrity of the electoral process—both actual and perceived, given 
how important it is to conceptually “buy into” the political process—these 
restrictions are almost certain to persist. If they must persist, scholars have offered 
several suggestions for assessing voting competency that will survive Equal 
Protection and Due Process challenges. Perhaps the best way to preserve the vote 
for the most amount of people would be to altogether eliminate restrictions based 
on mental competency. However, if these restrictions must persist, they should be 
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based on an individual judicial determination of lack of voting competency. As to a 
mental competency standard, various aspects of voting competency—
understanding the nature and effect of voting, as well as forming a choice about 
candidates—may pose differing levels of challenge in testing, scoring, and 
interpreting those scores. Nevertheless, the power of Congress to regulate time, 
place, and manner of federal elections may empower voting legislation focused on 
ensuring that the qualification of mental competency is uniformly enforced 
nationwide. 
 
